The advent of the Big-Data paradigm and the thereby emerging personalized tracking and monetization of personal information have amplified the privacy concerns of Internet users. Privacyenhancing technologies struggle to keep pace with this Internet-scale development, and currently lack even the basic methodology to assess privacy in this world of rapid dissemination of unstructured, heterogeneous data with many involved actors. We refer to this problem as privacy in open web settings. Existing privacy models (k-anonymity, t-closeness, or the currently most popular notion of Differential Privacy) are inherently inadequate to reason about online privacy: they require an a-priori structure and classifiedssification of the data under consideration, and they disregard adversaries that utilize ubiquitously available background knowledge to infer further privacy-sensitive information.
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Introduction
The Internet has undergone dramatic changes in the last two decades, evolving from a mere communication network to a global multimedia platform in which billions of users not only actively exchange information, but increasingly conduct sizable parts of their daily lives. While this transformation has brought tremendous benefits to society, it has also created new threats to online privacy that existing technology is failing to keep pace with. Users tend to reveal personal information without considering the widespread, easy accessibility, potential linkage and permanent nature of online data. Many cases reported in the press show the resulting risks, which range from public embarrassment and loss of prospective opportunities (e.g. when applying for jobs or insurance), to personal safety and property risks (e.g. when sexual offenders or burglars learn users' whereabouts online). The resulting privacy awareness and privacy concerns of Internet users have been further amplified by the advent of the Big-Data paradigm and the aligned business models of personalized tracking and monetizing personal information in an unprecedented manner.
Developing a suitable methodology to reason about the identifiability of users in such a large-scale, open web setting, as well as corresponding tool support in the next step, requires at its core a formal privacy model for assessing to what extent a user is disseminating private information on the Internet. Any adequate privacy model needs to live up to the now increasingly dynamic dissemination of unstructured, heterogeneous user content on the Internet: While users traditionally shared information mostly using public profiles with static information about themselves, nowadays they disseminate personal information in an unstructured, highly dynamic manner, through content they create and share (such as blog entries, user comments, a "Like" on Facebook), or through the people they befriend or follow. Furthermore, ubiquitously available background knowledge about a dedicated user needs to be appropriately reflected within the model and its reasoning tasks, as it makes it possible to decrease a user's privacy by inferring further sensitive information. As an example, Machine Learning and other Information Retrieval techniques provide comprehensive approaches for profiling a user's actions across multiple online social networks, up to a unique identification of a given user's profiles for each such network.
As of now, even the basic methodology is missing for offering users technical means to comprehensively assess the identifiability and linkability risks incurred by their data dissemination, and their daily online activities in general. Existing privacy models such as k-anonymity [56] , l-diversity [39] , t-closeness [37] and the currently most popular notion of Differential Privacy [20] follow a databasecentric approach that is inadequate to meet the requirements outlined in the previous paragraph. We refer the reader to Section 2.2 for further explanations on existing privacy models.
Contribution
We take a first step in developing a formal privacy model for privacy in open settings such as the Internet. We first provide an insight into the different dimensions that contribute to privacy risks in open web-settings, before we then develop a novel approach to identity disclosure in open web-settings.
Our model defines and assesses identity disclosure (i.e. identifiability and linkability of identities) by utilizing the notion of entity similarity, i.e., an entity is private in a collection of entities if it is sufficiently similar to its peers. At the technical core of our model is the new notion of d-convergence, which measures the similarity of entities within a larger group of entities. It hence provides the formal grounds to assess the ability of any single entity to blend into the crowd, i.e., to hide amongst peers.
In contrast to existing models, we do not have to differentiate between non-sensitive and sensitive attributes, but rather start from the assumption that all data is equally important and can lead to privacy risks. More specifically, our model captures the fact that the sensitivity of attributes is highly context-dependent, i.e., attributes can be or become sensitive for a specific entity when interacting with its peers.
We show that our model and its underlying notion of d-convergence implies existing privacy notions if one considers a setting with structured data only: we define a suitable transformation of our statistical model to a statistical database and subsequently show that a d-convergent database is also t-close, and using previous results, therefore is also differentially private.
The d-convergence model is furthermore capable of assessing identity disclosure risks specifically for single entities. To this end, we extend the notion of d-convergence to the novel notion of (k, d)-anonymity, which allows for entity-centric privacy assessments by requiring d-convergence in the local neighborhood of a given entity. Intuitively, this new notion provides a generalization of k-anonymity that is not bound to matching identities based on pre-defined key-identifiers.
Finally, we perform an instantiation of our anonymity model for the important use case of analyzing user-generated text content in order to characterize specific user profiles. We use unigram frequencies extracted from user-generated content as user attributes, and we subsequently demonstrate that the resulting unigram model can indeed be used for quantifying the degree of anonymity of-and ultimately, for differentiating-individual entities. For the sake of exposition, we apply this unigram model to a collection of 40 million comments collected from the Online Social Network Reddit, which we stripped down to 15 million comments to keep the evaluation tractable. The computations were performed on two Dell PowerEdge R820 with 64 virtual cores each at 2.60GHz over the course of six weeks. Our evaluation confirmed hypotheses about the privacy of entities in our dataset and provided deeper insights into its structure. We thereby validate our statistical model approach for evaluating privacy characteristics in real-world settings.
Outline
We first explain why existing privacy notions are inadequate for reasoning about identifiability and linkability in open web settings in Section 2.2. We then define our novel privacy model in Section 3. Section 4 instantiates the general model for the use case of profile analysis using unigram frequencies, and Section 5 presents the results of the empirical evaluation of our privacy model based on Reddit. We discuss related work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
Background
We start by discussing the differences between privacy in open settings such as the Internet, and closed settings such as statistical databases.
Privacy in Open Settings
In recent years, the Internet has evolved to a global multimedia platform in which billions of users actively exchange information in a multitude of different ways. This information dissemination behavior can (not exhaustively) be described as follows:
A) information is shared on different (independent) platforms under different (anonymous) identities B) information is shared through a variety of actions, e.g. through text-content, video-content, direct interactions with the functionality offered by a specific online platform etc. C) sensitivity of information is a function of user valuation and context: e.g. there is information users do not want to share on platform A, but will share on platform B as long their identities on both platforms cannot be linked, and the same piece of information is only sensitive on platform A for user U 1 , but not for user U 2 D) depending on context, any kind of information can be identifying E) information is not necessarily disseminated by the user directly, but by other, connected users that function as secondary/tertiary sources of information Overall, we are dealing with multiple data sources that can contain various types of sensitive information, which, while separately might be considered as an instances of classic private data-publishing models, in their entirety present an entirely new set of challenges for privacy research. These challenges include, e.g.
I)
Understanding which information is disseminated through user actions.
II)
Correctly capturing user preferences on sensitivity of information depending on context.
III)
Soundly modeling information spreading behavior on online platforms.
IV)
Assessing the linkability of identities across platforms.
Many of the above challenges have independently been addressed in the literature, and we refer to the related work in Section 6 for a discussion of these works. However, the identity disclosure problem in particular has not yet been sufficiently treated: while there exists work for actively matching identities, using a variety of features, there is, to our knowledge, no work for assessing identity disclosure risks in the open settings discussed above. In this paper we provide a first approach for dealing with this task.
Inadequacy of Existing Models
In this section, we discuss the (in-)adequacy of the most common existing privacy models to reason about identifiablity and linkability risks in open web settings: k-anonymity [56] , l-diversity [39] , tcloseness [37] and the currently most popular notion of Differential Privacy [20] . All of these models provide technical means for privacy-friendly data publishing. They target scenarios in which all data is available from the beginning, remains static and is globally sanitized in order to provide rigorous privacy guarantees. In what follows, we describe, by means of four different requirements, why these are inadequate to assess privacy in the setting considered in this paper. (To anticipate the conclusion: all of these notions have been designed for and excel in protecting attribute disclose of individuals in static contexts, but they are not designed to reason about identity disclosure on the Internet; see below.) a) Absence of structure and classification of data. All the aforementioned privacy models require an a-priori structure and classification of the data under consideration. Any information gathered about an individual thus has to be embedded in this structure, or it cannot be seamlessly integrated in these models. This contradicts the open web scenario described before, in which users disseminate unstructured, heterogeneous data in a highly dynamic manner. b) No differentiation of attributes. All of these models except for Differential Privacy require an additional differentiation between key attributes that identify an individual record, and sensitive attributes that a users seeks to protect. This again contradicts the absence of an a-priori, static structure in our setting. Moreover, as pointed out above and in the literature [43] , such a differentiation cannot be made a-priori in general, and it would be highly context-sensitive in the open web setting. For example, information about religious views, gender or health would be commonly classified as sensitive. However, a Christian would be unlikely to consider it sensitive to openly spell out his religious views while participating in a Christian community; however, the same user might consider this information sensitive in the context of a political discussion. c) Ubiquitously available background knowledge. All of these models, except for Differential Privacy, do not take into account adversaries that utilize ubiquitously available background knowledge about a target user to infer additional sensitive information. A common example of background knowledge is openly available statistical information, e.g., one can infer with significant probability that a target user is indeed a Christian, if one already knows that he is male and was born in Western Europe (given that Christianity is the majority religion there), and if additionally no conflicting information can be found or deduced. d) Privacy for individual users. All these models provide privacy for the whole dataset, which clearly implies privacy of every single user. One of the major challenges of privacy in the open web setting, however, is that there is no means to access and process all available data: relevant data might be inaccessible to the analysis, it can change highly dynamically, or the amount of data may simply be too large and unwieldy. Even for a closed environment such as a single Online Social Network that consists of a collection of users, collecting all information of all users within the OSN is typically impossible because of access constraints and legal restrictions. This leads to the requirement to provide a local privacy notion that is capable of assessing privacy for every individual user, even if we only have partial access to the available data. While some of the existing privacy notions already have been applied to provide local guarantees (e.g. in spatial cloaking), we believe that they can easily be generalized to provide such local privacy guarantees also in different contexts.
The notion of Differential Privacy only fails to address some of the aforementioned requirements (parts a and d ), but it comes with additional shortcomings with regard to privacy in the open web setting: the adversary is assumed to know almost everything about the dataset in question (everything except for the information in one database entry). This assumption enables Differential Privacy to avoid differentiation between key attributes and sensitive attributes. This strong adversarial model, however, implies that privacy guarantees are only achievable if the considered data is globally perturbed [19, 21, 22] . This global perturbation is typically not possible for the common user-driven data dissemination in the Internet as considered in this paper.
The conceptual reason for the inadequacy of existing models for online privacy can also be explained using the privacy taxonomy of Zheleva and Getoor [63] . There, they formulate two major privacy problems: the first one concerns identity disclosure where a given user's profile is identified from a set of (anonymous) profiles and subsequently linked to the said user. The second one concerns the problem of attribute disclosure in which an adversary tries to infer additional information about a specific user. Privacy models have thus far mainly been concerned with the problem of attribute disclosure: protection against identity disclosure was then attempted by preventing the disclosure of any (sensitive) attributes of a user to the public. In contrast to static settings such as private data publishing, where we can decide which information will be disclosed to the adversary, protection against any attribute disclosure is infeasible in the highly dynamic open web setting that we are considering in this paper: in fact, public dissemination of personal attributes is continuously happening, and allows any capable adversary to collect this information and thereby extend its knowledge about the user. We therefore aim to assess the risk of identity disclosure in this paper by taking into account all publicly disseminated user data.
Model Definition
In the following we give the formal definition of the d-convergence model. We begin by discussing an example that introduces the different notions used throughout the paper. We then define the adversary and the threat scenario we consider in our model. Led by the requirements set by this threat model, we then define the entity model and the notion of d-convergence.
Example
Consider the following example: Employer Alice receives an application by potential employee Bob which contains personal information about Bob. Before she makes the decision on the employment of Bob, however, she searches the ¡internet and tries to learn even more about her potential employee. A prime source of information are, for example, Online Social Networks (OSNs) which Alice can browse through. If she manages to identify Bob's profile in such an OSN she can then learn more about Bob by examining the publicly available information of this profile.
In order to correctly identify Bob's profile in an OSN, Alice takes the following approach: based on the information found in Bob's application, she constructs a model θ B that contains all attributes, such as name, education or job history, extracted from Bob's application. She then compares this model θ B to the profiles P 1 , . . . , P n found in the OSNs and ranks them by similarity to the model θ B . Bob now faces the problem that Alice could learn information about him that he does not want her to learn. He basically has two options: he either does not share this critical information at all, or makes sure that his profile is not identifiable as his. In OSNs such as Facebook, where users are required to identify themselves, Bob can only use the first option. In anonymous or pseudonymous OSNs such as Reddit or Twitter, however, he can make use of the second option. He then has to make sure that he does not share enough information on his pseudonymous profiles that would allow Alice to link his pseudonymous profile to him personally.
Alice Bob
Privacy in the open web is mostly concerned with the second option: we cannot protect an entity against sharing personal information through a profile which is already uniquely identified with the entity . We can, however, estimate how well an pseudonymous account of can be linked to , and through this link, learn personal information about . As the example above shows, we can essentially measure privacy in terms of similarity of an entity in a collection of entities E.
The identifiability of then substantially depends on the attributes exhibits in the context of E and does not necessarily follow the concept of personally identifiable information (PII) as known in the more common understanding of privacy and in privacy and data-protection legislation [2] : here, privacy protection only goes as far as protecting this so-called personally identifiable information, which often is either not exactly defined, or restricted to an a-priori-defined set of attributes such as name, Social Security number, etc. We, along with other authors in the literature [43, 42] , find however that the set of critical attributes that need to be protected differ from entity to entity, and from community to community. For example, in a community in which all entities have the name "Bob", exposing your name does not expose any information about yourself. In a different community, however, where everyone has a different name, exposing your name exposes a lot of information about yourself.
In terms of the privacy taxonomy formulated by Zheleva and Getoor [63] , the problem we face corresponds to the identity disclosure problem, where one tries to identify whether and how an identity is represented in an OSN. We think that this is one of the main concerns of users of frequently used OSNs, in particular those that allow for pseudonymous interactions: users are able to freely express their opinions in these environments, assuming that their opinions cannot be connected to their real identity. However, any piece of information they share in their interactions can leak personal information that can lead to identity disclosure, defeating the purpose of such pseudonymous services.
Before we begin with the formal definitions, we briefly explain some of the notation used throughout the paper: We write out probabilities in the form P r[X = x] = p, which denotes that an event or a random variable X takes the value x with probability p. We often also write P r[X = x | θ] which denotes the probability of the same event given the statistical model θ that supplies the probability. Our probabilities are defined over discrete event spaces that are usually clear from context, but are explicitly stated if necessary.
Threat Model
We first discuss the threat-model we want to cover with our model. Our main concern is privacy analysis in open settings such as the Internet, e.g. for reasoning about privacy in OSNs. We denote this setting as "open web setting" and the corresponding privacy problem as "online privacy": in their daily use of the Internet, entities leave a digital footprint by sharing personal news, commenting on different topics, interacting with other entities and otherwise disseminating information to the public. This digital footprint is a ubiquitous source of information shared through unstructured, heterogeneous data. An adversary that can tap into this source of information can learn massive amounts of information about these entities, possibly leading to the disclosure of private information that these entities did not want to share.
To this end, we consider the following statistical adversary Adv: on the one hand, Adv passively observes information disseminated by entities on the Internet and in this way obtains his public knowledge κ pub . On the other hand, Adv also uses a-priori knowledge κ prior that represents e.g. common knowledge about the relation of pieces of information, or entity-specific knowledge he gained from prior observations. With this information he then tries to conclude further information about each entity that has not yet been publicly disseminated. More formally, given the combined knowledge κ = κ pub ∪ κ prior , the adversary Adv tries to give an answer Adv(κ, G) to an information goal G related to the observed entities. These information goals can take arbitrary forms. For privacy in OSNs in particular, we consider the following information goals for the adversary:
A) given two pseudonymous user profiles in different (or the same) OSNs, do they belong to the same entity?
B) given an a-priori profile of an entity, which user profile in an OSN belongs to this entity? C) given a set of requirements, which entities in an OSN fulfill these requirements? (e.g. for targeted advertisement, headhunting, discrimination, etc.)
Our privacy model tries to approximate adversarial knowledge of each entity and bound the adversary's advantage in achieving these goals for private entities. To this end we need a privacy model that is able to capture any kind of knowledge the adversary can obtain and present it in a form in which we can reason about the aforementioned privacy goals. We furthermore need to be able to compare different entities with regard to their information potential and their eligibility for the aforementioned information goals. We take these requirements as a guideline for the definitions we present in the following sections. The adversary described above is generally weaker than the adversary used in the model of Differential Privacy [20] , where the adversary has complete knowledge about the whole dataset except for a single entity. Having a weaker adversary model, however, is fully intentional. As pointed out repeatedly in the literature [31, 8] , the all-knowing Differential Privacy adversary often does not allow for meaningful privacy guarantees since these can only be achieved by globally adding noise to the whole dataset. One major challenge of the open web setting, however, is that it does not allow for global sanitation of the dataset. We can, at best, locally manipulate entity data, e.g. by providing privacy assessment and proposing more private alternatives to entity interactions through (to-be-developed) entity-centric privacy tools. We therefore have to relativize adversarial capabilities.
Our adversary model allows for an adversary with scalable strength, using the adversary's apriori knowledge κ prior as a tuning knob. In the limits, our statistical adversary can coincide with the Differential Privacy adversary (if the a-priori knowledge is large) as well as with the uninformed adversary used in other privacy notions (if the a-priori knowledge is empty). Our goal with this approach is to comprehensively abstract adversarial capabilities, while simultaneously allowing for meaningful privacy assessment in an open web setting.
We want to emphasize one of the above information goals in particular: the problem of identifying the profile of an entity from an OSN presented in point B represents a central problem in online privacy, since an adversary that can satisfiably solve information goal B can also solve A and C with similar methods. Inspired by the definition of identity disclosure in the privacy taxonomy by Zheleva and Getoor [63, Definition 10.4] we can formalize information goal B as follows: Given a target entity T , the adversary tries to identify the * from a collection of entities E = { 1 , . . . , n } in an OSN that corresponds to T . The adversary abstracts his knowledge about T in a model θ T as well as he abstracts his knowledge about the entities 1 , . . . , n in models θ 1 , . . . , θ n . These constitute his a-priori knowledge κ prior and public knowledge κ pub respectively. With this knowledge the adversary then decides which entity corresponds to T . Definition 1. Given a collection of entities E = { 1 , . . . , n } and a target entity T , T 's corresponding entity * ∈ E is disclosed with confidence t if
where κ = κ prior ∪ κ pub with κ prior = {θ T }, κ pub = {θ 1 , . . . , θ n } and G ident is the identity disclosure goal of correctly identifying the entity corresponding to T .
We explore the implications of our privacy definition to the identity disclosure problem specifically in Section 3.5.
Definitions
In the following we present the basic definitions for our identity disclosure model.
Entity Models
Before we can start reasoning about identity disclosure risks, we first need to capture the information disseminated by entities in a comprehensive entity model. This entity model can, in general, take any arbitrary form, e.g. vector representations of features, or ontology representations of entities. In the context of this work, we propose the use statistical models for capturing entity information: these statistical models capture the behavior of these entities in terms of probability distributions, and in particular describe which attributes an entity exhibits in public interactions with which frequency. While we will consider statistical models as our entity model of choice in the rest of the paper, all anonymity definitions are generalizable to any other type of entity model. Definition 2. Given a set of attributes A, the statistical model θ of an entity determines the probability P r[α | θ ] that the entity exhibits the attribute α ∈ A.
Here, the probability of an attribute α can be understood as the pervasiveness or importance of this specific attribute in the observed behavior of the entity . The probability for each attribute is usually determined by observing public actions and interactions of and processing them to learn the importance of the attribute for 's profile. In the open web setting, this usually corresponds to the analysis of unstructured, heterogeneous data using Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing technologies which provide statistical information about the distribution of attributes with regard to an entity.
The statistical model can furthermore also include a-priori knowledge by the adversary: the probabilities of each attribute do not necessarily depend on observed behavior alone, but also on the insight of the adversary on how the entity will behave.
In the end, the statistical model θ constitutes an abstraction of the entity 's behavior which is then used for similarity investigations. The exact instantiation of this abstraction is variable and will depend on the goals and approach of the specific use case. In Section 4 we illustrate the construction of these statistical models for anonymity and linkability analyses in OSNs where we use unigram frequencies as attributes.
The notion of statistical model can also be extended to a collection of entities. The statistical model of a collection of entities simply gives the probability for a specific attribute being exhibited by a randomly chosen entity from the set.
Definition 3. Given a set of attributes A, the statistical model θ E of a collection of entities E determines the probability P r[α | θ E ] that an entity ∈ E, chosen uniformly at random, exhibits an attribute α ∈ A. θ E is determined by
for each attribute α.
Entity Similarity
The main idea behind our model is to measure entity anonymity and linkability in terms of entity similarity in a collection of entities. To this end, we introduce a measure of similarity for entities that is based on a statistical distance D for probability distributions that fulfills the properties of a metric: (2) non-negativity and identity of indiscernibles -P = Q ⇒ D(P, Q) = 0 and (3) triangle inequality -given D(P, Q) and
Having a distance measure that fulfills these metric properties allows for a intuitive interpretation of the thereby derived similarity measure, and furthermore allows for simpler proofs of our results. In general, the choice of the entity similarity (or distance) measure will heavily depend on the chosen entity model. As long as this measure is metric, however, all subsequent results should also hold with a different setup.
One metric that is particularly well-suited in our setting is the Jensen-Shannon distance [23] that is based on the Kullback-Leiber divergence using the base-2 logarithm. This metric already has been proven to be successful in many related IR scenarios; hence we decided to adopt this notion.
Definition 4. Let P and Q be two statistical models over a discrete space Ω which are absolutely continuous to each other, i.e. sup(P ) = sup(Q). The Jensen-Shannon divergence is defined by
where D KL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence
and M is the averaged distribution M = 1 2 (P + Q). In our use case, the above metric can be interpreted as follows: Let P and Q be the statistical models of two entities. Given a sample α from an unknown statistical model R with either R = P or R = Q, D JS (P, Q) 2 is twice the expected information gain when deciding between P and Q assuming both models are equally likely. For example, let D JS (P, Q) = 1, then the information gain is 1 bit and thus the sample is enough to distinguish which statistical model has been chosen. Based on this metric, we can define the similarity of entities as follows:
Definition 5. Let θ 1 and θ 2 be the statistical models of two entities which are absolutely continuous to each other, i.e. sup(θ 1 ) = sup(θ 2 ). Then, the similarity between those statistical models is defined by sim(θ 1 , θ 2 
The above similarity measure will return results in the interval [0, 1], where a similarity of 1 means that the statistical models are identical and 0 means that the two statistical models have nothing in common.
Equipped with the above similarity measure, we can also determine the statistical similarity of a specific entity to a collection E: sim(θ E , θ ) then estimates the similarity between and the average entity drawn from the collection E.
Anonymity
To assess the identity disclosure risk of an entity within a collection E, we use the following intuition:
is anonmyous in E if there is a subset E ⊆ E to which is similar. The collection E' then is a anonymous subset of E for .
We measure "being similar to" using the similarity measure introduced above. A collection of entities in which the similarity if all entities to is large (i.e.
We can now take a look at some elementary properties of d-convergent collections and entities that are compared to this collection. The first property states that given a convergent collection of entities, an entity that is not very similar to the collection is also not very similar to any entity of the collection. This is simply a sanity check to see that our definition of collections of entities does indeed make sense.
Both these attributes intuitively make sense in the context of anonymity and linkability: all entities in an indistinguishable set of entities should also be pairwise indistinguishable and an entity which is very distinguishable from a set of indistinguishable entities should be distinguishable from each entity in this set.
Conversely, we can introduce a similar entity into a converging collection of entities without disrupting the convergence of the collection, i.e. an entity which is very similar to a collection of entities will not decrease the convergence if introduced to the collection. Corollary 2. Let E be a d-convergent collection and let be an entity with divergence
Unfortunately, both of the above corollaries do not give very good bounds for the resulting similarity values, since they cover all types of entity collection. These can also include degenerate cases where the bounds mentioned are exactly achieved. Having additional information about the distribution of entity models can help to lower these bounds. We will not, however, go into more detail in this work since we do not have any evidence to support specific entity model distributions in real-world settings.
Convergence measures the similarity of a collection of individuals. Anonymity is achieved if all individuals in a collection are similar to each other. This leads us to the definition of (k, d)-anonymity, which extracts a subset of entities in which all entities are pairwise similar. Definition 7. An entity is (k, d)-anonymous in a collection E if there exists a subset E ⊆ E with following properties that ∈ E, that |E | ≥ k and that E is d-convergent.
An important feature of this anonymity definition is that it provides anonymity guarantees that can be derived from a subset of all available data, but continue to hold once we consider a larger part of the dataset. We call such anonymity guarantees "local".
Corollary 3.
If an entity is (k, d)-anonymous in a collection of entities E, then it is also (k, d)-anomyous in the collection E ⊃ E.
Intuitively, (k, d)-anonymity is a generalization of the classical notions of k-anonymity to arbitrary settings without pre-defined quasi-identifiers. Furthermore, d-closeness closely resembles the notion of t-closeness if we restrict ourselves to statistical databases, as we show in Section 3.6.
Entity Matching
As described in Section 3.2, we consider the adversary Adv who tries to achieve identity disclosure: his goal is to match entities from a collection E to his target entity T , or to decide whether two entities in a collection belong to the same person. In the following, we formalize the notion of matching entity models required for this task. We assume the adversary has a statistical model θ T to describe his target T , which he then uses to identify T in the collection E.
We measure the similarity of entities using their statistical models and the statistical similarity of these models. As before, we use the similarity measure sim we derived from the Jensen-Shannon divergence.
Definition 8. An entity c-matches a target entity
Similarly, we can also define the notion of one entity matching a collection of entities.
Definition 9. A collection of entities E c-matches a target entity T if all entities ∈ E c-match T .
Here the value c measures the similarity between an entity and the target entity T . In an ideal world, the adversary Adv would require c = 1 for a perfectly matching entity. This might not, however, always be feasible, as the target entity's behavior in E might differ from the previous observations made and captured by Adv in θ T . Also, θ T will inherently contain uncertainty unless Adv has a perfect history of T 's past behavior.
The idea now is that the entity * ∈ E that c-matches T for the largest value of c should be '. However, depending on the distribution of properties in and the structure of E, the entity * might either not be unique, or not correspond to T . In particular if E is d-convergent for a large value of d, the adversary will not be able to find the unique entity matching T .
Lemma 1. Let
Hence, if the adversary Adv cannot choose his confidence value c large enough, e.g. because of errors in his statistical model θ T , Adv will not be able to uniquely identify a single entity ∈ E that matches his target T . We also get the same result if the whole collection is not convergent, but if there exists a subset of convergent entities that allows the target to remain anonymous. In Section 3.5 we explore how these properties can help us in mitigating the risk of identity disclosure, a problem we introduced in Section 3.2. Linkability Across Collections A significant draw of the Internet is the ability to communicate in different OSNs under different pseudonyms without having these pseudonyms connected to the same person. An adversary can, however, use information disseminated under each pseudonym to link these pseudonyms. The d-convergence model we introduced above can also be used to deal with this case.
Consider a collection E of entities and entity which has a pseudonymous entity ' corresponding to itself in another collection E. We now want to know whether ' can be identified as 's pseudonymous entity in E . Taking the same approach as above, we use the notion of c-matching in order to find entities in E that are similar to ; and, similarly, if ' is (k, d)-anonymous in E , we have to c-match ' to for a very high matching value c in order to uniquely identify '. Overall, this again boils down to the risk of identity disclosure that we will examine further below.
Identity Disclosure
We now provide an assessment for the probability that a given adversary successfully links matching entities. The notion of (k, d)-anonymity we introduced in Section 3.3 intuitively means that an entity is able to hide among at least k other entities with a similarity of at least d. This ideally implies that an adversary is not able, or at least is severely hindered, in uniquely identifying an entity in a anonymous subset. In the following we bound the probability with which an adversary can successfully identify the unique entity from a collection of entities E = { 1 , . . . , n } that corresponds to an outside target entity T .
Before we can provide this bound, we need to first argue with what probability the adversary selects an entity that supposedly matches T . We think that this value can best be estimated by considering the similarity sim(θ , θ T ). of each entity ∈ E to the entity T . If we want to identify one specific entity with T , our confidence in this decision will depend not only on sim(θ , θ T ), but also on the similarity values of every other entity. By equating our confidence with the relative magnitude of 's similarity to T compared to all other entities' similarity, i.e.
∈E sim( t , ) we scale our confidence with the distribution of the similarity values.
Assuming this decision process, we can now bound the confidence value with which can be identified if this entity is anonymous in a collection of entities. Theorem 1. Let the corresponding entity * of the entity T in the collection E = { 1 , . . . , n } be (k, d)-anonymous in E. Let c-match * and let c + d > 1. Then the identity disclosure can only happen with confidence at most t ≤ c c+(k−1)(c+d−1) . Proof. Let E * be the (k, d) anonymous subset of * in E. Let t * be the confidence value of identifying a st from E * . Then clearly t < t * since we remove all possible, but wrong candidates in E \ E * . By Lemma 1 we can lower bound the similarity of each entity in E * to T , i.e.
We can now bound t * as follows:
Theorem 1 shows that, as long as entities remain anonymous in a suitably large anonymous subset of a collection of entities, an adversary will have difficulty identifying them with high confidence. This supports our claim that our anonymity notion directly tackles the problem of identity disclosure. In Section 5.4 we present experiments that evaluate the anonymity and linkability of individuals in the Online Social Network Reddit, and measure how well they can be identified from among their peers.
Comparison to Database Privacy
Many of the classic privacy notions such as k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness and -differential privacy describe privacy in the context of data publishing in statistical databases. The notion of (k, d)-anonymity introduced above seeks to leverage the insight gained from database-privacy notions to online privacy. In the following we discuss the relations between (k, d)-anonymity and the privacy notions for statistical databases.
Canonical Transformation The first problem is that classic privacy notions deal with statistical databases, whereas we handle the more general case of entities that exhibit attributes. We can, however, transform the more general case into a statistical database scenario. Given a collection of entities E we generate a database by having a row for each entity ∈ E. The columns of the table consist of each property that entities in E exhibit, and the database entries record whether an entity exhibits an attribute α. For a collection E we denote the database obtained by this canonical transformation as D E .
Definition 10. Let E be a collection of entities. Then D E is the database table obtained from E by following the translations:
1. introduce a column for every attribute α ∈ A 2. introduce a row for every entity ∈ E 3. in cell ( , α) put the value of α for entity .
Database privacy usually differs between key attributes and sensitive attributes: key attributes exists in order to identify a specific dataset, whereas the sensitive attributes contain the information that should ideally be hidden to anyone that accesses the database in order to obtain statistical information. In our model we generally do not differentiate between key and sensitive attributes. In order to capture the differentiation between key and sensitive attribute, We can, however, extend our model by partitioning the set of attributes A into two sets A = K ∪ S, where K is the set of key attributes and S the set of sensitive attributes. We would then only require the set S of sensitive attributes to have a statistical divergence of at most 1 − d to achieve d-convergence.
Comparison of Privacy Notions
We recall the definition of t-close databases, as introduced by Li and Li [37] , which requires that the distribution of sensitive attribution for every relevant subset of entries is at most t-far from the general distribution of sensitive attributes.
Definition 11.
A database D is t-close if the distribution of the sensitive attributes for every equivalenceclass of the key attributes has a statistical distance of at most t from the distribution of the sensitive attributes in the full table D.
If a collection of entities E is d-convergent in the sensitive attributes S, then the table D E obtained through the canonical transformation is at least (1 − d)-close, since any subset E ⊆ E has a statistical distance of at most (1 − d) from the averaged distribution θ E .
Soria-Comas and Domingo-Ferrer [55] show that t-closeness of a database also implies (log t)-differential privacy if we assume an uninformed adversary that knows only about the marginal distribution of the sensitive attributes.
Theorem 2 (Soria-Comas et al. [55] ). Let D be a t-close database. Then D is also (log t)-differentially private for an uninformed adversary.
The adversary model usually assumed in Differential Privacy is generally very strong: the adversary is allowed to know everything about the attribute distributions for all but one entity in the dataset for which he has to decide whether he exists in the dataset or not. As discussed in Section 3.2, this adversary model is too strong and impractical for our use case of online privacy. We therefore cannot show that d-convergence implies any kind of Differential Privacy in general (since d-convergence does not add any noise to the published data).
If we restrict ourselves to differential privacy against an uninformed adversary, however, we can derive differential privacy from d-convergence: since d-converge implies (1 − d)-closeness, we get log(1 − d)-differential privacy for our canonical database D E by applying Theorem 2.
Corollary 6. Let E be a d-convergent collection of entities. Then D E is at least (log(1 − d))-differentially private for an uninformed adversary.
Alternate Use
At its core, the d-convergence model is simply an indistinguishability notion that is interpreted for the application in identity disclosure in open settings. Indistinguishability problems, however, also appear in other areas in computer security: one example is Anomaly Detection, where a detector tries to identify anomalous processes by distinguishing their behavior from accepted behavior patterns, an approach known as behavioral blacklisting [46] . We can use our model to abstract process behavior: we would then understand model attributes α as the processes' ability to execute a certain command, and the probability of each attribute α would be estimated by the frequency with which the observed process executes the command. Statistical similarity, as we define in Section 3.3, can then be used to determine whether the model θ p of a process p is too similar to an ideal model θ ideal of blacklisted process behavior.
We envision that our statistical model approach can also be successfully applied to these different use cases. However, whether this approach leads to better results than existing solutions that rely on other Machine Learning techniques such as Support Vector Machines or Bayesian Networks and others still needs to be evaluated.
Restrictions
The quality of the assessment provided by our model largely depend on the approximation of adversarial knowledge we consider: if we can assume an exact representation of adversarial knowledge, these assessments automatically turn into lower bound guarantees on entity identifiablity and linkability. In practice, however, the adversary might have access to previously unknown sources of information that can help him in his decision making. We will then have to account for this by either smoothing our statistical model with an additional model that approximates the adversary's outside knowledge, or by making sure that no other information disclosure happened or will happen in the future. All of these concerns lead to the problem of comprehensive profile building for entities in an open setting; this is an open question that has been examined somewhat in the literature [10, 17, 13, 53, 7] , but on the whole still leaves a lot of space for future work.
This concludes the formal definitions of our d-convergence model. In the next sections, we instantiate it for identity disclosure risk analyses based on user-generated text-content and apply this instantiation to the OSN Reddit. 
Unigram Model
For the sake of exposition, we exemplify in this section how an adversary could estimate the statistical models introduced in the general model above and in particular consider the problem of profile matching across OSNs. Therefore, we update the notation introduced earlier to be more in line with our use case for OSNs.
Definition 12.
A profile P is a collection of text-fragments P = {t 1 , . . . , t m } over a base vocabulary V, t i ∈ V * , which describe the user using profile P in an Online Social Network. To uniquely identify a profile P , let U be the set of users and S be the set of OSNs. Then, a profile P is identified by the pair (u, s) ∈ U × S, shortly denoted by P u,s .
The set of all profiles in a OSN s ∈ S is a collection of profiles O s = {P u1,s , . . . , P un,s }. The set of all profiles in all OSNs is the union
The text-fragments t 1 , . . . , t m are generally taken from the individual profile's webpage or comment history, and contain profile information, such as name, location, hobbies etc., but also user-generated content such as status messages, blog posts, etc. Later on, in our use case on the Online Social Network Reddit, specifically, the text-fragments consist of user-generated comments.
Based on the information provided for each profile P we now need to capture this information in statistical models θ P as defined in Definition 2. In the following we explain how we estimate the statistical model.
Profile Estimation Given a base vocabulary V, which contains all possible unigrams appearing in text fragments of user profiles, we determine the statistical model θ P for a profile P ∈ O, which yields the probability P r[w | θ P ] that a unigram w appears in profile P . We estimate this probability using an empirical statistical modelθ P that is based on observed information about the unigram frequencies, i.e. P r[w |θ P ] = count(w,P ) w ∈V count(w ,P ) . This constitutes the basic statistical model which we can now use for privacy measurements according to our privacy model. In the next section we introduce the Reddit dataset on which we perform our evaluations by using statistical models as instantiated above.
Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our privacy metric on a real-world dataset that contains highly unstructured and heterogeneous content.
While the main focus of this paper is to present the actual privacy model as such, the following experiments are meant to provide first insights into the application of our model, without the overhead of too complex adversarial capabilities. The evaluation can can easily be extended to a more refined model of an adversary without conceptual difficulties. In particular, we examine the problem of identity disclosure across different online social networks as discussed in Section 3.5 and assess the privacy of individuals in an online social networks against an adversary without additional a-priori knowledge. To this end, we utilize the unigram model that was introduced in the previous section to validate our statistical model approach for evaluating privacy characteristics in real-world settings.
Therefore, we utilize the unigram model that was introduced in the previous section.
In this section, we first describe the dataset that we collected, also explaining how we collected it. Second, we briefly describe the processing steps on our dataset and the conducted experiments. Third, we present three hypotheses that we intuitively expected to hold true for real world scenarios, and forth, we either validate these hypotheses or we provide deeper insights into the structure of our dataset in case our hypotheses fail. Finally, we conclude that our model is applicable in practice.
Data-Collection
For the empirical evaluation of our privacy model, we use the online social network Reddit [1] that was founded in 2005 and constitutes one of the largest discussion and information sharing platforms in use today. On Reddit, users share and discuss topics in a vast array of topical subreddits that collect all topics belonging to one general area; e.g. there are subreddits for world news, tv series, sports, food, gaming and many others. Each subreddit contains so-called submissions, i.e., user-generated content that can be commented on by other users.
To have a ground truth for our evaluation, we require profiles of the same user same user across different OSNs to be linked. Fortunately, Reddit's structure provides an inherent mechanism to deal with this requirement. Instead of considering Reddit as a single OSN, we treat each subreddit as its own OSN. Since users are identified through the same pseudonym in all of those subreddits, they remain linkable across the subreddits' boundaries. Hence our analysis has the required ground truth. The adversary we simulate, however, is only provided with the information available in the context of each subreddit and thus can only try to match profiles across subreddits. Ground truth in the end allows us to verify the correctness of his match.
To build up our dataset, we built a crawler using Reddit's API to collect comments. Recall that subreddits contain submissions that, in turn, are commented by the users. For our crawler, we focused on the large amount of comments because they contain a lot of text and thus are best suitable for computing the unigram models.
Our crawler operates in two steps that are repeatedly executed over time. During the whole crawling process, it maintains a list of already processed users. In the first step, our crawler collects a list of the overall newest comments on Reddit from Reddit's API and inserts these comments into our dataset. In the second step, for each author of these comments who has not been processed yet, the crawler also collects and inserts her latest 1, 000 comments into our dataset. Then, it updates the list of processed users. The number of 1, 000 comments per user, is a restriction of Reddit's API.
In total, during the whole September 2014, we collected more than 40 million comments from over 44, 000 subreddits. The comments were written by about 81, 000 different users which results in more than 2.75 million different profiles. In order to visualize the distribution of users and comments in our dataset, the next paragraphs present three figures dealing with different aspects of the distribution of our data. Note that the figures also show the distribution after an intermediate filtering step that we will discuss later in Section 5.2. Figure 2a depicts the distribution of comments per user in our dataset -the x-axis shows the number of comments, and the y-axis shows the number of users with this number of comments in log scale. Because of the aforementioned restriction regarding the crawler, we could only crawl a maximum of 1, 000 comments per user. However, because some users occurred in the newest comments multiple times, there are a few users that have more than 1, 000 comments. Figure 2b demonstrates the number of users per subreddit. In this figure, the x-axis shows the number of users, and the y-axis shows the number of subreddits with this number of users in log scale. Note that we omitted some datapoints with more than 8, 000 users, because their bars are too small to be visible. The largest subreddit, in particular, has 55, 845 users in it, but there is only one such subreddit.
Finally, Figure 2c shows the number of different subreddits per user. The x-axis shows the number of different subreddits, and the y-axis shows the number of users that have comments in this number of subreddits in log scale. For example, there are more than 100 users in our dataset that commented in 150 -159 subreddits.
The whole dataset is stored in an anonymized form in a MySQL database. Since the size of the dataset is about 50GB, we are not able to generally release it to the public. However, we will make it available on individual request.
Data-Processing
The evaluation on our dataset is divided into sequentially performed computation steps. All computation steps have been performed on two Dell PowerEdge R820 with 768GB memory in a highly parallelized manner. Most of the time, all 32 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPUs, each running at 2.60GHz, have operated at full capacity (using hyper-threading, we increased the number of logical cores to 64). On this system, it still took us 6 weeks to finish all of our experiments.
Our goal is to assess the privacy of individuals within our dataset and its dependency on the user's behavior. The computation steps to achieve this goal include the normalization of all comments, the computation of unigram models for each profile, a filtering of our dataset to keep the evaluation tractable, the computation of profile similarities and the computation of (k, d)-private subsets.
Normalizing Comments
When considering unstructured, heterogeneous data as in our case, the data may contain a variety of information. For example, the utilization of text formatting and punctuation can constitute valuable information about a user's behavior. Although we could also transform this kind of information into attributes, we do not consider this here for the sake of simplicity.
In order to get a clean representation to apply the unigram model on, we convert the comments into lower case and remove any Reddit formatting. Moreover, we apply a unicode specific normalization and replace URLs by their hostnames. We also remove all kind of punctuation from the comment except for smilies, since these are often used in a similar role as words to express a feeling. Duplicated characters, which can add emotional nuances to the writing, occurring in words like cooool are shortened to a maximum number of three repeated characters. Therefore, we perform six different preprocessing steps on the data, which we describe in more detail in the following.
Convert to lower case letters: In our statistical language models, we do not want to differentiate between capitalized and lowercased occurrences of words. Therefore, we convert the whole comment into lower case.
Remove Reddit formatting: Reddit allows users to use a wide range of formatting modifiers that we divide into two basic categories: formatting modifiers that influence the typography and the layout of the comment, and formatting modifiers that include external resources into a comment. The first kind of modifier, named layout modifiers, is stripped off the comment, while leaving the plain text. The second kind of modifier, called embedding modifiers, is removed from the comment completely.
One example for a layout modifier is the asterisk: When placing an asterisk both in front and behind some text, e.g., *text*, this text will be displayed in italics, e.g., text . Our implementation removes these enclosing asterisks, because they are not valuable for computing statistical language models for n-grams and only affect the layout. Similarly, we also remove other layout modifiers such as table layouts, list layouts and URL formatting in a way that only the important information remains.
A simple example for embedding modifiers are inline code blocks: Users can embed arbitrary code snippets into their comments using the ' modifier. Since these code blocks do not belong to the natural language part of the comment and only embed a kind of external resource, we remove them completely. In addition to code blocks, the category of embedding modifiers also includes quotes of other comments.
Remove stacked diacritics: In our dataset, we have seen that diacritics are often misused. Since Reddit uses Unicode as its character encoding, users can create their own characters by arbitrarily stacking diacritics on top of them. To avoid this kind of unwanted characters, we first normalize the comment by utilizing the unicode character composition, which tries to combine each letter and its diacritics into a single precombined character. Secondly, we remove all remaining diacritic symbols from the comment. While this process preserves most of the normal use of diacritics, it is able to remove all unwanted diacritics.
Replace URLs by their hostname: Generally, a URL is very specific and a user often does not include the exact same URL in different comments. However, it is much more common that a user includes different URLs that all belong to the same hostname, e.g., www.mypage.com. Since our statistical language models should represent the expected behavior of a user in terms of used words (including URLs), we restrict all URLs to their hostnames.
Remove all punctuation: Most of the punctuation belongs to the sentence structure and, thus, should not a part of our statistical language models. Therefore, we remove all punctuation except for the punctuation inside URLs and smilies. We do not remove the smilies, because people are using them in a similar role as words to enrich their sentences: Every person has her own subset of smilies that she typically uses. To keep the smilies in the comment, we maintain a list of 153 different smilies that will not be removed from the comment.
Remove duplicated characters: In the internet, people often duplicate characters in a word to add emotional nuances to their writing, e.g., cooooooooool. But sometimes the number of reduplicated characters varies, even if the same emotion should be expressed. Thus, we reduce the number of duplicated characters to a maximum of 3, e.g., coool. In practice, this truncation allows us to differentiate between the standard use of a word and the emotional variation of it, while it does not depend on the actual number of duplicated characters.
Inspired from methods in information retrieval, we also filter out so-called stopwords. Stopwords are very frequent words that occur in almost every text, e.g., and, the, a. Since those words are common in almost every user's vocabulary, stopwords generally do not carry a lot information [58] , nor do they belong to a user's specific vocabulary. Thus, we explicitly exclude a list of 597 of these stopwords from the comments. The list also includes single characters like t and s that result from our normalization steps. 
Computing Unigram Models
From the normalized data, we compute the unigram frequencies for each comment. Recall that our dataset consists of many subreddits that each form their own OSN. Thus, we aggregate the corresponding unigram frequencies per profile, per subreddit, and for Reddit as a whole. This, later on, allows us to smooth the statistical models using the smallest common partition. From this data, we can compute the statistical models as described in Section 4. Since a subreddit collects submissions and comments to a single topic, we expect the unigrams to reflect its topic specific language. Indeed, the 20 most frequently used unigrams of a subreddit demonstrate that the language adapts to the topic. As an example, we show the top 20 unigrams (excluding stopwords) of Reddit and two sample subreddits Lost and TipOfMyTongue in Table 1 . As expected, there are subreddit specific unigrams that occur more often in the context of one subreddit than in the context of any other subreddit. For example, the subreddit Lost deals with a TV series that is about the survivors of a plane crash and its aftermath on an island. Unsurprisingly, the word island is the top unigram in this subreddit. In contrast, the subreddit TipOfMyTongue deals with the failure to remember a word from memory and, thus, has the word remember in the list of its top three unigrams.
Filtering the Dataset
During our evaluation process, we found that our dataset is too large to compute the pairwise similarity of all profiles in a timely manner since it would result in more than 7.57 trillion similarity measurements. Consequently, we decided to filter the dataset to only compute similarities of interesting profiles. We define an interesting profile as one that contains at least 100 comments and that belongs to a subreddit with at least 100 profiles. Additionally, we dropped the three largest subreddits from our dataset to speed up the computation. In conclusion, this filtering results in 58, 091 different profiles that belong to 37, 935 different users in 1, 930 different subreddits. In order to compare the distribution of users and comments of the unfiltered and the filtered dataset, both distributions are plotted in the figures of Section 5.1. In general, the distributions are very similar to those of the unfiltered dataset except for an overall decrease. Figure 2a shows the number of comments per user and clearly indicates that we filtered users with less than 100 comments. The decrease of users with about 1, 000 comments arises from dropping the three largest subreddits. Figure 2b shows the number of users per subreddit. Due to our filtering, there are less subreddits that contain at most 50 users and no subreddits that contain more than 1, 800 users. Figure 2c shows the number of different subreddits per user. While the shape of the figure is essentially the same as in the corresponding figure of our unfiltered dataset, the maximum number of different subreddits a user has comments in drops significantly. This drop, however, is caused by filtering out small subreddits that, for example, only contain one comment of one user who has several comments in other subreddits.
Similarities Within Subreddits
Now that we have reduced the number of profiles, the next step is to compute the pairwise similarity within subreddits. Letθ P1 andθ P2 be the statistical models of two profiles within a subreddit. Their similarity can then be computed by sim(θ P1 , θ P2 ). Naturally, computing the similarity only makes sense for two different profiles, since the similarity of a profile and itself is always 1. Excluding this special case, the minimal, maximal and average similarity of two profiles in our dataset are approximately 0.21, 0.81 and 0.39 respectively.
Private Subsets
Utilizing the similarities within subreddits, we can determine the private subsets for each profile in a subreddit. As already shown in Section 3, this is a NP-hard problem.
We solve this problem by using an approximation which computes the most convergent subsets from the 25 most similar profiles. While this approach will not always provide the optimal solution, it will provide the optimal solution where the close neighborhood is evenly spread out -in fact, it will only differ for edge cases where the profile differs significantly from all other profiles in the collection and the optimal private subset would not be very convergent anyway. This will still allow us to compare the relation between privacy and distinguishability across online social networks.
Using the above method, we determined the most convergent (k, d)-private subset for k = 5, to which we restricted ourselves due to computation time restrictions.
Similarities Across Subreddits
Lastly, to determine an adversary's matching confidence, we need to compute the similarities of those profiles across subreddits that belong to a private subset with a user who is active in multiple subreddits. More specifically, let u be a user who has several profiles {P u,s1 , . . . , P u,sn } in different subreddits and let Π u,si ⊆ O si , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the private subsets that contain these profiles. Then, we compute the pairwise similarities of all profiles in the union of private subsets i∈{1,...,n} Π u,si for all users u ∈ U.
The similarity of two profiles P 1 and P 2 in different subreddits is then determined as sim(θ P1 , θ P2 ). The minimal, maximal and average similarity of two profiles are approximately 0.22, 1 and 0.40 respectively; the 1 appearing due to a spambot posting exactly the same comment repeatedly in two subreddits.
Hypotheses
Regarding the results of our experiments, we investigate three different hypotheses about the privacy implications in our Reddit dataset.
Hypothesis H 1 states that a user will be better distinguishable from his peers the more comments he publishes.
Hypothesis 1. The convergence of the most private, size-5 subset for a profile P decreases with the number of comments exhibited by P .
Hypothesis H 2 , on the other hand, postulates that the profile of a user which is more private amongst his peers is more difficult to match to the same user's other profiles in different subreddits.
Hypothesis 2. The confidence with which the profile P can be matched to its corresponding profile P * decreases with the convergence of P * 's most private, size-5 subset.
Hypothesis H 3 postulates that a profile P is more private the more its unigram distribution coincides with the unigram distribution of its subreddit.
Hypothesis 3. Let Top20 denote the top 20 most used unigrams in a subreddit. The unigram cover of a profile P in this subreddit is the fraction of P 's unigrams the fall into Top20. A profile P is more private if its unigram cover is large.
Evaluation
In this subsection, we evaluate our hypotheses by interpreting the results of our experiments. However, before investigating and explaining various correlations within our dataset, we give evidence that our unigram model indeed provides a suitable abstraction of real users for reasoning about their privacy.
Therefore, we consider the similarities of a profile P u,s and all profiles within a private subset Π u,s of the same user. Figure 3a depicts the average similarity of P u,s and the profiles in Π u,s \ P u,s on the x-axis and the matching value of P u,s and P u,s on the y-axis. The yellow line denotes the function y = x and divides the figure into two parts: if a point lies above the line through the origin, the profile P u,s matches P u,s better than the average of the remaining profiles in Π u,s and vice versa. Since most datapoints lie above the yellow line, two profiles of the same user P u,s and P u,s match better than P u,s and the average of the most similar users to P u,s .
Conclusion:
This distribution confirms our unigram model to be a suitable abstraction.
Hypothesis 1
Our first hypothesis relates the privacy of a profile P u,s to the number of comments made in this subreddit. Figure 3b shows the privacy of a profile represented by the convergence d of its (5, d)-private subset Π u,s on the y-axis and the number of comments made by user u in subreddit s on the x-axis. In contrast to our hypothesis, the privacy increases with the number of comments. One possible explanation is the structure of Reddit in which each subreddit is very topic-specific. In that case, disseminating a lot of topic-specific content could hide the profile amongst her peers. However, Figure 3c shows almost the opposite: measuring the amount of topic-specific content by utilizing the top 20 unigram coverage of the subreddit demonstrates that this coverage only increases subtly for profiles with a larger number of comments.
As a different explanation, since the number of different unigrams should increase with the number of comments, the average probability for one single unigram should decrease and thus smooth out any peaks in the probability. As a consequence, the profile is more similar to other profiles with a comparable number of comments. Indeed, Figure 4a shows that the average probability for one unigram denoted on the y-axis drops with an increasing number of comments denoted on the x-axis. Moreover, Figure 4b confirms that profiles with a high number of comments often belong to private subsets, in which the other profiles also have a high number of comments. This figure, relates the number of comments of a profile on the x-axis to the average number of comments of the other profiles in this subreddit on the y-axis.
Conclusion:
At least in our Reddit dataset, a profile is more private the more comments its user disseminates.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis states that the matching confidence for a profile P * should decrease with the convergence of its most private, size-5 subset. In order to check whether this hypothesis holds true in our Reddit dataset, we consider all users that are active in multiple subreddits and compute the matching confidences between their profiles. Each matching confidence is plotted on the y-axis of Figure 4c along with the convergence of the corresponding private sub-set. In particular, let P u,s and P u,s be two profiles of the same user, and let t be the confidence value that an adversary matches profile P u,s with P u,s . Let Π u,s be the (5, d)-private subset that contains P u,s . Then, our plot contains the data point (d, t). The yellow line in the foreground represents the linear regression of our data.
In contrast to our hypothesis, we observe that the confidence stays approximately constant across the whole range of convergence values. However, we found after a careful inspection of our data, that this behavior is due to our dataset.
As Figure 5a shows, the average similarity of a profile P u,s with all profiles in the private subset Π u,s depicted on the y-axis indeed grows with the convergence depicted on the x-axis. Intuitively, this makes it harder for an adversary to determine the correct matching profile for P u,s in a more private subset, since the average of similarities to this subset is also very high.
However, Figure 5b shows that we have a positive correlation between the convergence d of a profile's private subset Π u,s on the x-axis and the matching value of the corresponding profiles P u,s and P u,s on the y-axis in our dataset. Since the adversary's confidence depends linearly on the matching value, this correlation leads to a generally higher confidence for more convergent private sets.
Conclusion:
The last two observations approximately cancel each other out, resulting in the constant correlation between the confidence and the convergence.
Hypothesis 3
Our third hypothesis correlates the top 20 unigram cover of a profile with its privacy measured by the convergence of its (5, d)-private subset. As we expected, a profile hides better among its peers the more its unigram distribution coincides with the unigram distribution of its subreddit. This correlation is shown in Figure 5c , which relates the percentage of a profile's unigram cover on the x-axis to the convergence of its private subset on the y-axis. The linear regression also confirms our hypothesis.
Conclusion:
A profile is more private among its peers the more it covers the unigram distribution of its subreddit.
Conclusion
In this section, we presented an empirical evaluation of our model showing that it was able to either confirm our hypotheses or to provide deep insights into the structure of our dataset in cases where our hypotheses were falsified. Moreover, we showed that the instantiation of our model using unigrams is indeed a suitable abstraction for a user. We also demonstrated that the individual's privacy heavily depends on the structure of the OSNs the individual disseminates content in. We successfully applied our model to a real world dataset and gave sufficient evidence that our model can assess identifiability and linkability risks in the open web setting. For the future, we thus would like to apply our model to datasets of other OSNs, gaining insights into the privacy of individuals in these OSNs.
Related Work
We give an overview over relevant related work.
Existing Privacy Notions The notion of privacy has been exhaustively discussed for specific settings such as statistical databases, as well as for more general settings. Since we already discussed the notions of k-anonymity [56] , l-diversity [39] t-closeness [37] and Differential Privacy [20] in Section 2.2 in great detail, we will now discuss further such notions.
A major point of criticism of Differential Privacy, but also the other privacy notions, found in the literature [31, 8] is the (often unclear) trade-off between utility and privacy that is incurred by applying database sanitation techniques to achieve privacy. Several works have shown that protection against attribute disclosure cannot be provided in settings that consider an adversary with arbitrary auxiliary information [19, 21, 22] . Since we do not consider attribute disclosure directly, but focus on identity disclosure (and the thereby fueled attribute disclosure), our privacy notion with the scalable adversary allows us to provide meaningful privacy assessments for specific users even without the necessity to globally sanitize data. This, however, should not be interpreted in that we improve existing notions in their traditionally considered setting, but that we target a different application domain.
Several interpretations of the parameter in the Definition of Differential Privacy have been proposed in the literature [27, 36] . While most of these interpretations agree that indicates the tradeoff between the degree of privacy achieved and the utility of the sanitized data, no general consensus on the practical meaning of the value has been found yet. Our notion of d-convergence provides an intuitively understandable privacy parameter that corresponds to the similarity of considered entities.
Several extensions of the above privacy notions have been proposed in literature to tackle use cases that differ from the classical database privacy [5, 11, 62, 33, 25, 64, 12] . The works aim to suitably transform different settings into a database-like setting that can be analyzed using differential privacy. As explained in Section 2.2, a similar transformation would however not be suitable for tackling the challenges of privacy in the open web.
Specifically for the use case in OSNs, many works [62, 33, 25, 64, 12] apply the existing database privacy notions for reasoning about attribute disclosure in OSN data. These works generally impose a specific structure on OSN data, such as a social link graph, and reason about the disclosure of private attributes through this structure. Zhaleva et al. [62] show that mixed public and private profiles do not necessarily protect the private part of a profile since they can be inferred from the public part. Heatherly et al. [25] show how machine learning techniques can be used to infer private information from publicly available information. Kosinksi et al. [33] show that machine learniing techniques can indeed be used to predict personality traits and users and their online behavior. Zhou et al. [64] apply the notions of k-anonymity and l-diversity to data protection in OSNs and discuss the complexity of finding private subsets. Their approach does however suffer from the same problems these techniques have in classical, statistical data disclosure, where an adversary with auxiliary information can easily infer information about any specific user. Chen et al. [12] provide a new notion of differential privacy which allows for privacy and protection against edge-disclosure attacks in the correlated setting of OSNs. The setting, however, remains static, and it is assumed that the data can be globally sanitized in order to provide protection against attribute disclosure. Again, as discussed in Section 2.2, this does not apply to the open web setting with its highly dynamic dissemination of unstructured data.
Statistical Language Models Statistical Language Models for information retrieval have first been introduced by Ponte and Croft [45] as an alternative approach for document retrieval and are inspired by language models for Speech Recognition and Natural Language Processing [54, 47] . They have subsequently been focus of a long line of research (examples include [35, 61, 57, 59] ) that further develop the basic statistical language model approach and its benefits. While Statistical Language Models have not been shown to perform better than other established retrieval methods [59] , we found that the Statistical Language Model formulation is closer than other options to what we require in expressing and solving indistinguishability problems that arise in computer security.
Data Processing in OSNs
There has been a significant amount of work in processing and understanding data obtained from OSNs [40, 14, 15, 44, 50, 9, 49, 18, 24, 28, 29, 16] . Different Natural Language Processing techniques have successfully been used to understand user-generated text content and derive information from it. This includes inferring location information [14] , political alignment [15] , health information [44, 50] and other attributes [9, 40, 24, 16, 28, 29] for specific users, but also detecting events and incidents that affect many different users [49, 18] . Even simply evaluating the context in which a user submits a search query can lead to attribute disclosure [30] . This exemplifies again that OSNs specifically, and the Internet in general, provide an ubiquitous source of data that can provide a significant amount of information about users.
Several works show that stylometric features of text can be leveraged to identify the author of a given text [32, 4, 3] . They consider attributes such as n-grams frequencies, usage of punctuation, etc., to match authors to texts. Inspired by these works, we follow a simplified approach of utilizing unigram frequencies as attributes of our statistical models for the experimental evaluation of our privacy model (see Section 4).
Privacy in Online Social
Networks A growing body of research [10, 13, 53, 48, 7, 17] shows that the above mentioned techniques can indeed be used to match an entity's profiles across different OSNs [10, 17] or to identify the unique profile of a given entity [13, 53, 7] . Scerri et al., in particular, present the digital.me framework [52, 51] which attempts to unify an entity's social sphere across different OSNs by, e.g., matching the profiles of the same entity across different OSNs. While their approach is limited to the closed environment they consider, their work provides interesting insights into identity disclosure in more open settings.
Several works in the literature (e.g. [34, 41] ) have focused on the protection of so-called Person-ally Identifiable Information (PII) introduced in privacy and data-protection legislation [2] , which constitute a fixed set of entity attributes that even in isolation supposedly lead to the unique identification of entities. Narayanan and Shmatikov, however, show that the differentiation between key attributes that identify entities, and sensitive attributes that need to be protected, is not appropriate for privacy in pervasive online settings such as the Internet [43, 42] . Technical methods for identifying and matching entities do not rely on the socially perceived sensitivity of attributes for matching, but rather any combination of attributes can lead to successful correlation of corresponding profiles. Our privacy model treats every type of entity attribute as equally important for privacy and allows for the identification of context-dependent, critical attributes.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a user-centric privacy model for reasoning about identifiablity and linkability in open web settings. Our model is grounded on statistical language models as the predominantly used concepts in Information Retrieval for characterizing documents with regard to their information content, and it thereby is capable of coping with arbitrary unstructured, heterogeneous data in dynamically changing contexts. The technical core of our model is our new notion of d-convergence that assesses the similarity of entities in a given setting, and thereby entails a novel definition of online privacy based on indistinguishability of entities. We have instantiated our model for privacy analysis in Online Social Networks based on unigram models, which are sufficiently strong to capture semantic meaning of text and further identifying features such as author-style. We have applied this instantiation to a dataset collected from the Online Social Network Reddit and show that our model is suited for the assessment of identifiability and linkablity in Online Social Networks. Our evaluation either confirmed hypotheses about the privacy of entities in our dataset or provided deeper insights into its structure in cases where the hypotheses were falsified. As far as future work is concerned, many directions are highly promising. First, we have thus far proposed a privacy model that inherently assumes ideal statistical models for accurate predictions. In practice, however, these statistical models are usually derived from empirical observations about specific entities and therefore only represent approximations of the actual attribute distribution. Suitably extending our model to account for such real-world inaccuracies constitutes an interesting research challenge. Second, information presented in Online Social Networks is often highly timesensitive, e.g., shared information is often only valid for a certain period of time, and personal facts can change over time. Explicitly including timing information in our privacy model will hence further increase the accuracy of the statistical models derived from empirical evidence. Finally, the accuracy of countermeasures against identity disclosure can be evaluated in our privacy model, and new such countermeasures with provable guarantees can be developed. On the long run, we pursue the vision of providing the formal foundations for comprehensive, trustworthy privacy assessments and, ultimately, for developing user-friendly privacy assessment tools.
